Russia’s calculations in Iran

Sunday 18/09/2016
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) talks with his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov (C) and Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during a summit in Baku,
last August.

London - Talks between Russia and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) over freezing oil production fell through in April but may resume as OPEC members meet on the side­lines of the International Energy Fo­rum in Algeria. The main problem in April appears unresolved: What to do about Iran, which wants to expand exports after the easing of international sanctions.
The Saudis have insisted that any freeze should not allow Iran to in­crease production and maintained this position after the recent an­nouncement during talks at the Group of 20 summit in China that Riyadh had reached an agreement with Moscow. The Saudis remain at odds with Russia, whose president, Vladimir Putin, has called for a pro­duction cap that would allow Iran the exports levels it enjoyed before punitive US and EU sanctions bit in 2012.
Russia is playing the honest bro­ker. In an interview with Bloomberg News at the Eastern Economic Fo­rum in Vladivostok before the G20 meetings, Putin stressed his hope that everyone “interested in main­taining stable and fair global en­ergy prices will in the end make the necessary decision”. He also called the Saudis “partners” and praised Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz as “very reliable”.
There is a tendency in Washing­ton to assume that, as rivals to the United States, Iran and Russia must be natural allies. This has been en­couraged by their cooperation in bolstering Syrian President Bashar Assad during the five-year Syrian war.
But parliamentary questions in Tehran embarrassing Iran’s senior officials after Russia announced its planes were using an airbase near Hamadan for Syrian bombing mis­sions highlighted the complexities of relations between the two near-neighbours. Their alliance over Syr­ia sits amid diverging interests and motivations.
The spat over Russia’s use of the base — leading to official Iranian as­surances it had just been to refuel and was temporary and therefore did not violate Iran’s constitution­al prohibition on foreign military bases — reflected Iranians’ memo­ries stretching to the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay when Imperial Russia acquired under the threat of force Iranian-held territories, including Armenia and much of Azerbaijan. More recently, the Soviet Union in­tervened in Iran during and after World War II, particularly in backing separatist movements among Iran’s Kurds and Azeris.
True, Iran and Russia are nu­clear partners. Moscow completed and supplies Bushehr, Iran’s only atomic power station, and is in long-running talks about building more but in 2006 Russia backed the US-led international move to re­fer Tehran’s nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. This was a jolt for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, who had been assured by the then top security official Ali Larijani that his “tilt to Moscow” could prevent such an eventuality. Instead the referral led to UN sanctions that would be removed only when Iran agreed to limit its nuclear capacity.
Today’s alliance of Russia and Iran in Syria does not preclude Moscow’s close relations with Isra­el as well as Saudi Arabia: Russia’s intelligence coordination with Tel Aviv has been enhanced to improve early identification of each other’s aircraft in Syria’s skies. Regarding energy, while Russia backs Iran’s desire to expand oil exports, the two sides have never developed potential for cooperation in a global gas market where their combined share is 35.5% of reserves (Iran 18.2%, Russia 17.3%).
The two countries do coordinate through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in which Mos­cow supports Iran’s request to up­grade from observer to full status. But the SCO is less a political alli­ance than a forum for basic coordi­nation between Russia and China and the central Asian former Soviet republics (also beginning next year, new members India and Pakistan). China has good relations with Saudi Arabia, its largest supplier of crude.
For many years, to the alarm of Israel and some in Washington, Russia has supplied arms to Iran, including recently the S-300 sur­face-to-air missile system. These missiles are primarily defensive and less advanced than Antey 2500 mis­siles that Russia supplied to Egypt.
“Nothing the Russians have pro­vided [Iran] so far has materially changed the military balance in the region,” said Sam Gardiner, consult­ant and former US Air Force colonel. “Ten years ago, Israel defined the S-300 as one of its red lines with re­spect to Iran, [meaning] they would have to initiate a conflict if the Ira­nians got the system. We have not seen that kind of reaction as they more recently acquired the system. I have concluded that is because Israel has found ways to penetrate and neutralise the S-300.
No doubt Tehran would like more advanced weapons. Iranian De­fence Minister Hossein Dehghan, calling Moscow’s announcement of its use of the Hamadan airbase as “showing off” and “discourteous”, was evidence of a wider frustration with Moscow.